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                                           Abstract 
 
An experiment is reported which tests for positive confirmation bias in a setting in which 
a person can make decisions about which evidence to select  to test a rule. The 
experiment reveals strong evidence of positive confirmation bias and a tendency not to 
choose the Bayesian- optimal selection of information. There is also evidence that the 
information, once selected, is used in a pattern of reasoning which, while sub- optimal, is 
internally coherent. These results are consistent with and expand on  previous results on 
the subject. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Over the past twenty years there has been a gradual increase in interest in the theory of 
learning in economics. While economists once assumed that agents could be modelled as 
rational optimisers, now there are attempts to explain how boundedly rational individuals 
actually learn and whether this learning process converges on optimising behaviour.(c.f. 
Borgers T 1996 and Cubitt & Sugden 1998) In general the theoretical results have been 
mixed (c.f. Fudenberg & Levine 1998 for an in- depth look at the subject). Empirically, 
as well as testing specific theories of learning ( see Erev & Roth 1998)   there has been 
some empirical research into learning biases (e.g. on the representativeness heuristic- 
Grether 1980, 1992). 
  One bias which has not received much interest from economists is the positive 
confirmation bias. This is a tendency, when testing an existing belief, to search for 
information which could confirm that belief rather than information which could 
disconfirm it. When assessing information in a framework of rational learning both types 
of evidence are relevant. There is a bias if more than reasonable effort is devoted to 
searching for confirming information. If positive confirmation is indeed a significant part 
of the processes used by humans in learning then we can expect it to have a significant 
impact on the decisions made by economic agents when learning.  
    To date there has only been one experimental  study made of this bias in the economics 
literature (Jones & Sugden 2001), although there is a large literature on positive 
confirmation in the psychology literature (e.g. Manktelow & Over 1993;Oaksford & 
Chater 1994; Cheng & Holyoak 1989). Jones and Sugden's paper adapted an experiment 
commonly used within psychology- the Wason Selection Task- by placing it within a 
Bayesian decision theory framework where the costs, benefits and prior probabilities of 
acquiring information were made explicit. 
   There were three principal conclusions derived from that experiment. One was that 
there was indeed such a thing as positive confirmation. While irrationality was not as 
pronounced in that experiment as similar experiments in the psychology literature, there 
was a general tendency towards positive confirmation in the data. Second, it was found 
that significant numbers of people would choose positive confirming, but irrelevant, 
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information even at a cost to themselves. Finally a new form of positive confirmation was 
discovered. This is positive confirmation in the use of information, where information 
which is interpreted as confirming a belief increased subjects' confidence in the truth of 
the belief even if, from a Bayesian point of view, that information had no value. 
  The Jones and Sugden experiment concentrated on demonstrating that positive 
confirmation could result in obviously irrational behaviour. For this reason, in the 
experiment, there was only a choice between relevant and rational behaviour on one hand 
and irrelevant and irrational behaviour on the other. However, this split only allows for 
one particular extreme category of irrationality caused by positive confirmation. The aim 
of the experiment in this paper is to test positive confirmation where information may be 
relevant, but not rational.    
   This broadens the scope of the positive confirmation bias from a relatively narrow 
situation, where positive confirmation results in  irrelevant information being used, to a 
situation where information is relevant, but the choice of that information does not 
maximise expected utility. It follows that, as with the Jones and Sugden paper, the 
experiment here reveals a pattern of information- gathering which contravenes the 
fundamental principles of Bayesian decision theory. 
 
   2. Rule Discovery Experiments 
 
   The experiment which is reported in this paper is related to a group of experiments 
known as rule discovery experiments.  A classic example of this is Wason's (1960) 
Numbers Game experiment. In this experiment the experimenter asked each subject to 
guess a hidden rule about triads of numbers (e.g. "Three numbers in ascending order of 
magnitude"). The subjects were then given one triad ("2,4,6") and were told that this 
followed the hidden rule. They were then told to make up their own triads of numbers to 
test the rule. For each triad they gave they had to write down the rule they thought they 
were testing. Then they were told whether the triad followed the rule or not. When the 
subject was happy that they knew the rule then they announced it and were told if they 
were correct or not. 
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  The results of these experiments were interesting in that the original rule ("Three 
numbers in ascending order of magnitude") seemed to be too general for the subjects to 
easily discover. Most subjects did not manage to discover it first time round. More 
important was the process used. When subjects had formulated a rule, they tended to 
issue triads which were consistent with this rule  rather than inconsistent with it. This 
suggested that they were suffering from positive confirmation bias. Subjects seemed to 
test a rule by enumerating examples of that rule rather than by attempting to find 
disconfirming evidence. 
 The positive confirming aspect of this was highlighted by Tweney et al. (1980) who, 
instead of putting the experiment in terms of  testing for one rule, reframed the 
experiment as a test of two mutually exclusive and exhaustive rules (called "DAX" and 
"MED"). The subjects had to find out the rule "DAX" but were told whether a piece of 
evidence obeyed the rule "DAX" or "MED" rather than just whether it was in "DAX" or 
not. This was found to increase the number of disconfirmations because the evidence was 
not specified in terms of whether it did or didn't obey the rule "DAX". 
   There have been attempts to expand the scope of these rule discovery experiments by 
creating simple scientific environments which one can explore and attempt to find the 
rules by which they operate (e.g. Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney 1978). In the cases which 
have been carried out the experimenters have claimed a pronounced tendency towards 
positive confirmation. 
  There have been many variations on the rule discovery tasks to date. Some of them have 
attempted to vary the experimental conditions to test the robustness of positive 
confirmation. An example of this is in Gorman & Gorman (1984) where the 
experimenters gave the subjects advice about how to test rules, with one group of 
subjects being given advice biased towards confirmation and the other being given advice 
biased towards disconfirmation. In general, it was found that this was effective in 
increasing the amount of disconfirming behaviour and also resulted in more people 
finding the hidden rule. 
However, they are all problematic, from the point of view of experimental economics 
because these experiments are not  decision- making tasks in the economics sense. 
Subjects are simply told to discover the rule. There is no structure of payoffs, prior 
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probabilities or  costs of acquiring information. This is a problem because, as Klayman 
and Ha (1987) point out, different prior probabilities for a rule could result in positive 
confirmation being used quite rationally to test for a rule. To be more precise, for a highly 
specific rule  which is a subset of most other possible rules it may be reasonable, for 
some prior probabilities, to search for evidence which, if true, would disconfirm the rule. 
However, for a very general rule, this would not hold if most other possible rules are 
subsets of this rule. In this case positive confirmation would be rational. Any decision 
theory version of a rule discovery task would need to specify the prior probabilities of all 
possible rules. 
         Experiments purporting to show positive confirmation have also been criticised by 
Evans (1972) on the grounds that the subjects could be suffering from a matching bias 
rather than positive confirmation. The matching bias is a perceptive bias resulting from 
an inability to understand the problems as set in experiments. As a result, subjects in rule 
discovery tasks simply choose those pieces of information which correspond most closely 
with the rule being tested. There is no testing of the rule- simply an automatic choice of 
information which corresponds most closely to the rule being tested.  This means that the 
evidence of Positive Confirmation which has been accumulated to date is simply 
evidence of subjects not properly understanding the task. This paper, amongst other 
things, aims to test this hypothesis. 
 
3. Experimental Design: Principles 
 
The basic aim of this experiment is to test for positive confirmation in a setting where 
individuals make information acquisition decisions with real financial consequences. In 
the experiment subjects are given a set of rules and "combinations". One of these rules is 
selected out as a "test rule" and the subject has to test this rule by using one of the 
possible combinations in order to find the unknown rule which is also one of these rules. 
This means that, while the experiment is related to the rule discovery tasks, it differs in 
that rather than have the subjects generate their own rules and "triads", they are given a 
set of rules and combinations.  
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In this experiment the subjects are asked to imagine that the rules are about balls in a bag. 
There are ten such balls in each bag and they may be either red or blue. Rules are 
descripitive of the numbers of balls in the bag such as: 
     "There must be at least 2 Red Balls"  
In this experiment the rules concentrate on the minimum number of red balls in the bag. 
Suppose that there is a set V of such rules. The set V is "nested" in the sense that all 
members of V are strictly implied by or imply other members. For example: 
     If  the statement "There must be at least 2 red balls" is in the set V then it is implied by 
"There must be at least 3 red balls" which is also in V.   
If we define rules which are implied by the majority of rules in V as outer rules and rules 
which imply the majority of rules as inner rules then we can define the middle rule as the 
rule which implies and is implied by equal numbers of rules. 
 
Such an imaginary bag, as suggested by the rules, would be tested by looking at its 
contents. An example of the contents of such a bag is known as a combination. A 
combination simply states the number of red balls and blue balls in such an imaginary 
bag e.g. "8 Blue; 2 Red".  A Combination x is said to be allowed by a rule Vi  V if Vi 
implies the existence of x. 
 For each ViV there is a set of combinations Qi which are allowed by Vi. Since the rules 
are assumed to be distinct, all Qi  Q are (strict) subsets of each other. N is the number of 
Vi in V and is constant across tasks and subjects. It is useful to define subsets of Qi 
known as bands. A band is defined as follows: A band Bi  B is a subset of Q i  Q but 
is not a subset of Q j  Q where Qj is the largest strict subset of Qi in Q. Roughly, bands 
are the set of combinations which are allowed by a rule Vi but not by other rules which 
imply rule Vi .  
Bands are outside a rule if its combinations are not allowed by the rule. Bands are inside 
a rule if its combinations are allowed by the rule.  
 
Suppose that there is an unknown rule U  V which is the rule which the subjects are 
trying to find. U is selected from V by a random process, independently for each task 
with a probability 1/N. In addition the experimenter chooses another rule H V which is 
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to be tested by the subjects. The aim of the experiment is for each subject to discover 
whether U = H or not. In order to help them they are given the choice of a combination 
and, once they have chosen a combination, are told whether or not this combination is 
allowed by the rule U.  Subjects are then told whether the combination they have chosen 
is allowed by the rule U or not. 
   Once the subjects have been given the information from the combination, then they 
have to make a judgement as to whether test rule H is the same as the unknown rule U. 
When the judgement has been made on all the tasks the subject is then rewarded 
according to whether the judgement is correct and whether U=H or not.  
 In this experiment there are no costs involved in acquiring information. However, the 
rewards differ according to the judgement made. The subject starts with an endowment of 
points and then gains points according to the accuracy of her judgement. If it is the case 
that  U=H and the judgement made is that UH or if it is the case that UH and the 
judgement is made that U=H then the subject is incorrect and gains no additional points. 
If it is the case that UH and the judgement is made that UH then the subject gains r 
additional points. If it is the case that U=H and the judgement is made that U=H then the 
subject gains (N-1)r additional points. This counterbalances the advantage of saying that 
UH because of the a priori equal likelihood of each rule being chosen.  
 
 At the end of the experiment one of the tasks in the experiment is picked out to be played 
for real using a die. After this, the number of points won by the subject in that task is 
calculated.  The subject enters a lottery in which the probability of winning a money prize 
is proportional to the total number of points credited to her. This means that, if the subject 
is rational in the sense of expected utility (and the money prize is preferred to nothing), 
then she will seek to maximise the expected number of points scored in each task. 
   This binary lottery system has been widely used in experimental economics as a means 
of inducing risk- neutral preferences. However, Selten, Sadrieh and Abbink (1999) have 
found evidence that, in fact, subjects are at least as risk averse with respect to payoffs that 
are denominated in terms of lottery tickets as they are with respect to payoffs that are 
denominated in money. In this case we cannot assume that subjects in the experiment are 
risk- neutral with respect to points. However, as will be explained in the next section, this 
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experiment does not rely on risk neutrality in the formulation of its null hypotheses. This 
means that a failure of risk neutrality would not ruin the tests for positive confirmation 
bias. 
 
4. Bayesian Analysis 
 
It is not the objective of this experiment to test whether the subjects are rational 
Bayesians. The use of the prior probabilities, the payments etc. are to achieve 
experimental control over the experiment rather than because the subject is expected to 
behave in a Bayesian fashion. Instead the aim is to test for a particular systematic bias, 
namely positive confirmation bias. For this reason the null hypotheses which we will give 
in the next section allow for the widest possible range of behaviour which is not 
consistent with positive confirmation. This includes Bayesianism but is not identical to it. 
    However, it is of interest to investigate what the optimal behaviour for a Bayesian 
subject would be in this situation. In this section we make the assumption that subjects do 
behave like  Bayesian optimisers to the extent of behaving correctly under the binary 
lottery system. 
   It can be shown (see Appendix 1) that the payoff from testing a combination from the 
bands inside H is Pinside where: 
 
             (1)          Pinside = r / N [1 + (j - 1) / (N - 1)] 
 
And the payoff from testing a combination from the bands outside H is Poutside where: 
 
             (2)          Poutside = r / N [1 + (N - j + 1) / (N -1)] 
 
Where j  J is an index of bands going from the innermost band (i.e. the set of 
combinations implied by all the rules) outwards.  It can be seen that increasing j increases 
the payoff from testing inside H and decreases the payoff from testing outside H. It 
follows that  the optimal bands for picking combinations for testing H are the two 
neighbouring the rule H. 
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    It is useful to define the concept of combinations or bands being immediately  inside or 
outside a rule. A band Bi  B is immediately inside rule Vi  V iff  when Qi  Q is the 
set of combinations allowed by Vi then the combinations in Bi are not allowed by any of 
the rules which imply Vi. Likewise a band Bi  B is immediately outside rule Vi V iff 
when Qj  Q is the set of combinations allowed by all rules outside Vi then Bi is that 
subset of Qj which is not allowed by Vi.     
 Suppose that rules are also labelled by indices from the set J. If  h  J is the index for  
rule H then the optimal band to choose is j = h + 1 if testing a combination outside H and 
j = h if testing a combination inside H. 
    Substituting into formulae (1) and (2) we get formulae (3) and (4) which show 
respectively the payoffs for testing for combinations in bands immediately inside and 
outside a rule: 
 
(3) PInside = r / N [ 1 + (h-1) / (N - 1)] 
 
(4) POutside = r / N [ 1 + (N - h) / (N - 1)] 
 
 
   If a rule H is an inner rule then it can be seen that PInside < POutside so that it is rational to 
choose a combination in the band immediately outside H.If a rule H is an outer rule then 
it can be seen that PInside > POutside so it is rational to choose a combination in the band 
immediately inside H. If H is a middle rule then the two payoffs are equal and one can 
rationally choose a combination in either band.  
  For those bands which are not immediately inside and outside the rule H then it can be 
seen through formulae (1) and (2) that, as the bands get further away from H then the 
payoff drops so that it becomes less rational to choose combinations in bands further 
away from H. The worst bands in this respect are the outermost and innermost bands. In 
these cases choosing a combination gives no additional information and so does nothing 
to increase the expected payoff. 
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   An examination of the formulae allows us to see that the variation in payoffs is  a result 
of variation in the number of rules excluded or included from the set of possible rules 
when a combination is chosen. This property will now be described using a more general 
notation which will be used to motivate the (more general) null hypotheses in the next 
section. 
   Define two sets W and Z as distinguishing sets where [W,Z] is a partition of  V. The 
combination  partitions the set V into [W,Z] where W includes all those rules Vi which 
allow  and Z includes all those rules which do not allow .  
   In general, given that all rules are initially equally weighted in terms of expected utility, 
a rational subject would want to increase the number of rules which are eliminated by the 
combination selected, as this would decrease the number of possibilities for U in the final 
choice. So, supposing that W includes the rule H , then the aim of the subject would be to 
reduce the number of rules in W and (hence) maximise the number of rules in Z. This 
would imply a policy of choosing in the immediate outside band for inside rules and 
choosing in the immediate inside band for outside rules. This  conclusion is identical to 
that reached for the payoffs, but is done in far more general terms. 
    However, as was mentioned beforehand, it is not intended that this paper should be a 
test of Bayesianism. The latter analysis simply sets out a framework for choice which can 
be applied to more general situations.   
 
Null Hypotheses in Experiment 
 
i) Choice of bands 
 
This experiment is cast in terms of stochastic choice, for given values of the parameters 
N, r, H and a given set of rules. A function  (.) is defined from the set B to the interval 
[0,1]. For each Bi  B,   (Bi) is defined as a decision probability. It is the probability that 
the subject chooses a combination in band Bi when attempting to find a combination to 
test rule H. Stochastic variation in choice is to be interpreted as resulting from 
imprecision or errors in individuals' preferences or beliefs (Loomes and Sugden 1995). 
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By allowing that some of subjects' behaviour is partly random ,in testing this paper will 
look for patterns of behaviour that cannot be explained by randomness. 
    Suppose that in task S a subject picks combination  in band G  B . This also creates 
two distinguishing sets [E,F ] for rules, partitioning V. Suppose that in task S' a subject 
picks combination ' in band G'  B. ' also creates distinguishing sets [E', F'] for rules 
also partitioning V.  Further suppose that E' has the same number of rules as F while F' 
has the same number of rules as E. In this case we refer to the bands G and G' as being 
symmetric. 
   Assume that H is the rule to be tested in S while H' is the rule to be tested in S'. H and 
H' are also described as symmetric when the band immediately outside H is symmetric to 
the band immediately inside H' and the band immediately inside H is symmetric to the 
band immediately outside H'. Two tasks S, S' which have their test rules H, H' as 
symmetric are known as symmetric tasks. If H and H' are symmetric then combinations  
and ' selected from symmetric bands G and G' will eliminate exactly the same number 
of rules and will have exactly the same chance of eliminating H or H' respectively. 
Because of the identical numbers of rules eliminated by  and ' we shall say that  
provides the same information in S as ' does in S' i.e. that they are isomorphic to each 
other. It follows that G and G' are also isomorphic to each other since all combinations in 
the two bands are isomorphic to each other. This means that for all symmetric G, G' then 
a person making a decision should  have  (G) =  (G'). This condition will be described 
as symmetric neutrality3. 
   When testing the results of the experiment it will be necessary to test for combinations 
in more than one symmetric band. If X  J is the set of indices for bands   Ai B which 
have been selected for testing in task S and X'  J is the set of indices for symmetric 
bands  Ai'B in task S' then  the null hypothesis with aggregated bands is: iX  (Ai) = 
iX'  (Ai') 
       If  we assume that decision bands A1, A2…B are bands inside the test rule H in task 
S then we can construct an alternative hypothesis for positive confirmation. If positive 
                                                           
3 Symmetric neutrality is satisfied by any stochastic theory of choice (c.f. Loomes & Sugden 1995) where 
the "core" of the choice model is a theory of dominance respecting preferences over lotteries (e.g. expected 
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confirmation exists then one would expect there to be a larger number of people choosing 
in bands inside the test rule H rather than outside. In the symmetric task S', the symmetric 
bands A1', A2'…B would be outside the test rule H' so we would expect there to be 
fewer choices in those bands. For individual bands therefore the alternative hypothesis 
would be  (Ai) >  (Ai')  while for groups of bands the alternative hypothesis would be  
iX  (Ai) > iX'  (Ai') 
   In the experiment there are tasks which are identical except for differences in the 
combinations which could be selected out of a given band. Suppose that D and D' are two 
such tasks with the bands which are tested being KB and K'B where K and K' are the 
same bands in D and D'.  However, since the combinations are in the same bands then it 
follows that there is no informational difference between picking a combination from K 
and a combination from K'. There is only a difference in labelling and the two questions 
are isomorphic with each other. Given the definitions above, for individual bands K and 
K', the null hypothesis is   (K) =  (K'). Likewise, if K1, K2, K3… B are bands in D 
and K1', K2', K3'………  B are the same bands in D' then we can define the null 
hypothesis as iX  (Ki) = iX  (Ki') where XJ is the index set of bands selected for 
testing. 
    In this case there is no "direction" in which we may expect any differences between the 
bands in the two tasks. For this reason the alternative hypotheses are those of inequality 
i.e.   (K)   (K') for bands K and K' and iX  (Ki)  iX  (Ki') for a collection of 
bands. 
     
ii) Judgements about the test rule 
 
As well as examining what evidence a subject chooses when testing H, it is also 
interesting to find out whether there is a bias in whether subjects judge H the same as U 
or not. Is there an excessive tendency for positive confirmers to judge H the same as U? 
    This question is made difficult by the fact that once positive confirmers have selected 
the evidence and have become non- Bayesian Positive Confirmers then it must be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
utility) . This solves the problem of risk aversion because the isomorphism between combinations means 
that  they must be treated the same under this broad class of theories. 
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doubted whether one can assume that the subject does behave like a Bayesian optimiser 
when using information. It is assumed therefore, as a null hypothesis, that the subject's 
choice of whether they believe that H=U or HU is independent of whether they have 
been told whether the combination they have selected is allowed by U or not. Positive 
Confirmation would then require that there should be a lack of independence and that this 
should be biased towards the subject saying H=U when the combination selected is 
allowed by U. 
 It should be noted that this null hypothesis is in fact far stronger than that required by 
Bayesianism. Bayesianism would simply require that the proportion of positive 
confirming  subjects stating that H=U when the combination is allowed by U should be 
equal to the  posterior probability of H=U. If H is an inner rule and N>2 then this 
probability will be less than 0.54.   
 
6. Experimental Design: Details 
 
The experiment was carried out at the University of Dundee in the year 2002. Subjects 
were recruited by e-mail on campus and they came from a wide range of course 
programmes across all the years. The 111 subjects took part in groups of up to 8 at a time.  
   In the main part of the experiment, the subject faced a series of six tasks, each of which 
had the general structure laid out in section three. Before starting these tasks, subjects 
were given full instructions about the nature of these tasks, about how points were scored 
and how points were converted into money prizes. These instructions were given orally, 
with some visual aids to illustrate various points. This was followed by an example of the 
task. Subjects worked through this task with the help of further oral instructions. In 
composing the instructions, care was taken not to suggest that there was a right way to do 
the task or to suggest that any strategy was preferable to any other. 
  After this, each subject answered two multiple choice questions, which were designed to 
test understanding of the task and the scoring system. In the first test question they were 
tested on their understanding of which combinations were allowed by a rule. In the 
                                                           
4 An attempt to test for this using symmetric responses across questions is not possible since the numbers of 
non- positive confirming choices of combinations which are allowed by U is too low for statistical 
significance. 
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second test question the subject was asked to give the number of points a person would 
get for an imaginary previous playing out of the experiment  If a subject got the questions 
wrong then they were given help. In general, the questions indicated a high level of 
understanding with more than 95% answering the questions correctly first time. 
     Each task involved a list of N = 5 rules. These rules were identical for each task in the 
experiment. A list of the rules and combinations is given in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Rules and Combinations used in the experiment 
 
Rules used in Experiment Combinations Combinations Var.
Rule (i)  : There must be at least 2 Red balls 1) 10 Blue; 0 Red 1) 9 Blue; 1 Red 
Rule (ii) : There must be at least 4 Red balls 2) 8 Blue; 2 Red 2) 7 Blue; 3 Red 
Rule (iii): There must be at least 6 Red balls 3) 6 Blue; 4 Red 3) 5 Blue; 5 Red 
Rule (iv): There must be at least 8 Red balls 4) 4 Blue; 6 Red 4) 3 Blue; 7 Red 
 Rule (v) : They must all be Red balls 5) 2 Blue; 8 Red 5) 1 Blue; 9 Red 
 6) 0 Blue; 10 Red 6) 0 Blue; 10 Red 
 
 As can be seen, the rules are listed in order going from the  most general (Rule (i)) to the 
least general rule (Rule (v)). In the column next to them are six combinations, one each 
from each "band" in between the rules. It should be noted that these combinations are 
evenly spaced out in numerical terms. These combinations are the combinations used in 
four of the questions in the experiment. The column next to this gives variant 
combinations used in two of the questions in the experiment. Note that these also one 
from each band between the rules. An example question in Appendix 2 gives the general 
layout of how these rules are presented and how the test rule is introduced. 
  For each task and each participant there was an envelope which contained a slip of 
paper with one of the five rules on them. For each task, the envelope was dealt from a 
pack of 10 envelopes containing two copies of each rule. The subject was told that they 
had to find out whether the rule to be tested (H in the notation used previously) was the 
same as the rule in the envelope (U in the same notation). 
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  The subjects were then told to choose one of the six combinations and to circle it, also 
writing down which one they had chosen. Once everyone had written down the 
combination, then the experimenter went around with the envelope for the subject and 
task and told the subject whether the combination they had chosen was allowed by the 
rule in the envelope. No other information was given about the rule in the envelope. The 
subjects were advised to record this information on their question sheet (see the sample 
questionnaire in appendix 2) 
   Once they had been told whether the combination they had chosen was allowed by the 
rule in the envelope, the subjects were asked a yes/ no question as whether the rule in the 
envelope was the same as the test rule. When they had answered this question then they 
went onto the next task. 
  Notice that the subject did not get any feedback on her actions until she had completed 
all the tasks. This ensured that her answers to later questions were not influenced by the 
answers to earlier questions. Some cross- task learning is inevitable in such multiple 
question experiments but since the order of the tasks was randomised there  were no 
systematic effects. 
    The six tasks in the experiment were divided into three pairs of symmetrical problems. 
These pairs of problems were identical in combinations and rules but the rule to be tested 
in one question in the pair was symmetrical to the rule being tested in the other. The first 
pair of tasks represented the "base" tasks. In these two tasks the rules being tested were 
rules (iv)  and (ii) (using the notation in table 1) which are symmetric rules. These tasks 
will be referred to as "Question 1" and "Question 2" respectively (although the actual 
order of the questions was randomised). This allows a basic test of positive confirmation 
where choosing positively confirming combinations does have some informative value 
but is irrational.   
The second pair of tasks tests the matching hypothesis. It is possible that the subjects may 
be choosing a combination simply because it replicates the number of red balls in the test 
rule and this may explain any positive confirming behaviour in questions 1 and 2. 
However, with similar behaviour in this pair of tasks this explanation is not plausible. 
While the rules, test rules and bands are the same, the combinations selected out of the 
bands come from the variant combinations in table 1 and do not have the same numbers 
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of red balls  as in the rules. Subjects therefore will not be able to choose through 
matching but will have to choose deliberately.  In this case the test rules are (iv) and (ii) 
(i.e. the same as before) and will be referred to as questions 3 and 4 respectively.  
 In the final pair of tasks  positive confirmation is tested at the extremes i.e. with the 
outermost and innermost rules (rules (i) and (v) respectively). A test of the innermost rule 
using positive confirmation gives no information at all. The confirmation simply implies 
that any of the rules in the experiment could be the unknown rule. By contrast testing 
immediately outside the innermost rule would be a decisive rational test- it results in 
certain knowledge of whether the test rule is the unknown rule or not. A test of the 
outermost rule allows for the comparison necessary for the null hypothesis. Apart from 
the choice of test rule, the rules, combinations and bands are the same as in the "base" 
question pair. The test of the innermost rule will be referred to as question 5, while the 
test of the outermost rule is question 6. 
   The structure of the six questions can be seen in table 2: 
 
Table 2: Questions in experiment 
 
 Test Rule Matching? Symmetric question 
Question 1 (iv) Yes Question 2 
Question 2 (ii) Yes Question 1 
Question 3 (iv) No Question 4 
Question 4 (ii) No Question 3 
Question 5 (v) Yes Question 6 
Question 6 (i) Yes Question 5 
 
The second column in the table gives the number of the test rule using the notation in 
table 1. The third column specifies whether the combination chosen could be explained 
by the matching hypothesis, while the fourth column specifies the question which is 
symmetric to that in the first column. 
    Once the subjects had completed all six tasks then the experiment was finished. The 
experimenter went round each subject in turn and the subject threw a die to determine 
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which of the six questions was played out. Once a question was selected then the 
envelope for that person and question was opened and the rule inside the envelope was 
compared to the test rule. Each person was given a base  of two  points to start. If the test 
and unknown rule were the same and the subject correctly said that they were the same 
then she gained four points. If the two rules were not the same then she gained one point. 
Otherwise she gained zero points. The total number of points was added together and the 
subject rolled the die again. If the number on the die was less than or equal to the total 
number of points then the subject won a cash prize of £12. 
 
7. Results 
 
         Table 3 presents a summary of the choices made by the subjects in the experiment.  
 
            Table 3: Combinations chosen by subjects for each question 
Comb no. Corr Rule Quest 1 Quest 2 Quest 3 Quest 4 Quest 5 Quest 6 
1  1 5 4 2 8 12 
2 i 13 17 5 14 26 26*# 
3 ii 17 44*# 1 24*# 7 11 
4 iii 20# 22 15# 28 5 20 
5 iv 45* 14 33* 29 18# 28 
6 v 15 9 53 14 47* 14 
* Immediately Positive Confirming combinations.    # Bayesian optimal Combinations 
 
In the first column, "Comb no." (=combination number) refers to the number of the 
combination as given in table 1, while the roman numerals in the "corr rule" 
(=corresponding rule) refer to the rule number. In each question in the questionnaire, 
each combination came from a separate band from the others, so effectively "Comb no." 
labels the bands from the outermost to the innermost. The numbering in "Corr Rule" is 
arranged so that each rule is aligned in the same row in the table as a combination which 
is in the band immediately inside that rule. The labels along the top of the table refer to 
the questions answered, with quest 1, quest 2 etc. referring to question 1, question 2 etc.. 
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          The table itself represents the number of subjects who chose each combination 
within each question.  A casual look at the evidence shows that there is substantial 
evidence for the existence of positive confirmation. In questions 1, 3,  and 5 there are 
substantially more people choosing the immediately positive confirming combination 
than there are choosing the Bayesian optimal combination. This is particularly clear- cut 
in question 1 and also in question 5 where 47 of the 111 subjects chose the positive 
confirmation option- even though this option gives no additional information at all. 
Noticeably the highest number of people in question 3 actually chose combination 6 
rather than the immediate positive confirming combination 5. 
    Looking at questions 2,4 and 6 we see that the Bayesian optimal combination was 
chosen by substantial numbers of subjects in all cases, but only in question 2 were the 
numbers choosing that combination the largest. Instead, there seems to be a spread of 
combinations chosen, although all are inside the test rule and so can be seen as 
"Positively Confirming". It is noticeable that question 4 seems to have a different spread 
of combinations chosen from question 2. 
   The results given in table 3 suggest that a useful approach to the analysis of this data 
would be to look at it in general and specific terms. In the latter case one would compare 
the bands immediately inside and outside test rules. In the former case one would 
compare all the bands inside and outside the test rule (if they have the same number of 
rules). This allows both a test of the Bayesian- optimal band as well as of positive 
confirmation which is not confined to one particular band inside the test rule. 
Table 4: Tests of Positive Confirmation- symmetric bands  inside/outside test rules 
*Use of McNemar test using 2 distribution at 5% level of significance 
Inside  Outside Immediate inside/ outside*   All inside/ outside*  
Quest 1 Quest 2 14.52# 23.29# 
Quest 3 Quest 4 9.756# 23.29# 
Quest 5 Quest 6 43.09# (Same) 
Quest 2 Quest 1 10.67# 55.68# 
Quest 4 Quest 3 0.29 55.68# 
Quest 6 Quest 5 0.2667 24.019# 
# Significant at 5% level of significance 
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    Table 4 looks at the symmetric bands  inside and outside the test rules for each 
question. In the table symmetric questions are compared with each other and the 
McNemar test is used to  test for differences between the symmetric bands in these 
questions. The first column in the table specifies the inside band of one question and this 
is paired with the symmetric outside band of the other question in the second column. 
The third column give the results for the tests of the choices in the bands immediately 
inside or outside the test rules while the fourth column gives the results for the tests the 
choices in all the bands inside or outside the test rules. So, for example, in the first row of 
the table the figure in the third column tests the choices in the immediate inside band of 
question 1 with the choices in the immediate outside band of question 2. By contrast, the 
fourth column tests all the choices in the inside bands of question 1 against all the choices 
in the outside bands of question 2. Note that the result for question 5 (inside) and 
question 6 (outside) is the same in both cases. 
    Using the null hypothesis of equality derived from symmetric neutrality, for the first 
three rows of the table, there is a significant difference between the numbers of people 
choosing combinations from the positive confirmation band(s) in questions 1,3 and 5 and 
from the symmetric bands in questions 2,4 and 6. This holds both for immediately 
positively confirming bands and for all positively confirming bands. This suggests that 
there is a general bias towards positive confirmation in all situations, even when this is 
irrational as in this case. 
     For the next three rows the story is mixed. Here the choosing of immediately 
positively confirming combinations is rational and one would expect the differences 
between these combinations and combinations from symmetric bands to be greater. 
However, this is not the case. For the immediate inside band of question 2 and immediate 
outside band of question 1 the difference is significant but this is not the case for the 
immediate inside bands of questions 4 and 6 and their symmetric bands. By contrast, 
using all inside and outside bands, the differences are highly significant in all cases. This 
difference in results can be explained by the fact that, for questions 4 and 6 there is a 
wide spread of combinations chosen from all bands inside the test rules. 
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                 Table 5: Tests of similarity of questions 
* Use of McNemar Test using 2 distribution at 5% level of significance 
Comparison between qs Immediate bands inside* Distribution of Combinations** 
Quest 1 vs Quest 3 3.6 4.115# 
Quest 2 vs Quest 4 8.33# 3.283# 
** Use of standardised marginal homogeneity statistic 
# Significant at 5% level 
           Table 5 shows the tests for differences between the two base tasks, questions 1 and 
2 on one hand and questions 3 and 4 on the other). This uses two tests. The first test 
simply compares the  differences in numbers of subjects choosing immediately inside the 
test rules of the questions using the McNemar statistic. The second test compares the 
distributions of choices of combinations across all bands using the standardised marginal 
homogeneity statistic. In both cases, as stated above the null hypothesis (for the first two 
rows) is that of equality.  All of the statistics, apart from the first row for immediate 
inside bands,  are significant, while the latter is only marginally insignificant. This 
suggests that there are major differences between behaviour between questions 1 and 3 
on one hand and between questions 2 and 4 on the other. 
    No statistical comparison can be done between questions 5 and 6 and the other 
questions since they are not isomorphic and so no meaningful null hypothesis can be 
formed. However, a glance at table 3 suggests that there does seem to be a considerable 
difference in distributions, particularly between the choices of combinations  in questions 
2 and 6. In the former the choices are "bunched" in the band immediately inside the test 
rule, while in the latter they are more spread out. 
    Another way of looking at the data can be seen in graph 1 where the subjects in 
questions 1, 3 and 5 are examined. In this case the graph shows positive confirmation 
defined over all bands inside the test rule and split up into "types" depending on which 
questions they answered according to positive confirmation (i.e. irrationally). It is easy to 
see that question 3 is the question with the largest amount of positive confirmation 
overall while question 5  has the smallest overall amount. However the numbers who 
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positively confirm in all three cases is quite large. It is also noticeable how few subjects 
don't have some form of positive confirmation bias.  
 
         Having tested for positive confirmation in the search for information, it is necessary 
to look for positive confirmation in the use of information. Table 6 shows the results for 
the reactions of subjects to the information selected. 
 
   Table 6: Reactions of Positive Confirming subjects to evidence 
 
Question/ 
Allowed 
 
Subject:  H  U
 
Subject: H = U 

2 Statistic  
(1 df) 
Contingency 
Coefficient 
Q1-  Not allowed 6 1 
Q1- Allowed 16 37 
8.209# 0.347# 
Q3- Not allowed 8 1 
Q3- Allowed 26 51 
10.243# 0.432# 
Q5- Allowed*  13 34 N/A N/A 
Q2- Not Allowed 34 5 
Q2- Allowed 20 30 
20.439# 0.326# 
Q4- Not Allowed 21 7 
Q4- Allowed 31 36 
6.580# 0.255# 
Q6- Not Allowed 36 6 
Q6- Allowed 33 24 
8.861# 0.287# 
* All combinations inside the test rule for question 5 are also inside all the other rules and so cannot 
distinguish between them. 
# Significant at the 5% level of significance  
 
         In this table, for each question, the analysis is confined to those subjects who picked 
combinations from positive confirming bands. The first column in the table gives the 
question and whether the combination picked is allowed by the unknown rule or not. This 
divides the table into groups of two rows for each question (with the exception of 
question 5). The second column gives those subjects who declared that the test rule was 
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not equal to the unknown rule (i.e. H U, while the third column gives those subjects who 
declared that the test rule was equal to the unknown rule (i.e. H = U). The fourth column 
gives the 2 test of independence for the two rows for each question. The fifth column 
gives the 2 based Contingency Coefficient measure of association between whether the 
rule is allowed and whether H=U or not. Question 5 by its very nature cannot have a 
Positive Confirmation combination which does not allow the test rule so there is only one 
row and no test statistic. 
      The table  shows significant statistics in all cases, demonstrating that the subjects' 
judgement is definitely affected by their choice of evidence. This is particularly 
interesting in the case of questions 1 and 3 where , if the combination is allowed then it 
increases the chances of the test rule being declared the same as the unknown rule by far 
more than is justified by the evidence. It should be noted that this is far more than would 
be justified under a Bayesian updating framework Even in question 5, where the evidence 
from positive confirmation is irrelevant, the fact that the chosen combination is allowed 
by the unknown rule seems to increase the likelihood of the subject stating that the test 
rule is the same as the unknown rule. 
   It would be expected that the same thing  would be the case with questions 2, 4 and 6, 
paerticularly since they include Bayesian choices. Indeed, they are all significant, 
although the number of those who declare that the test rule and the unknown rule are not 
equal is comparatively high in all cases. This can be seen in the Contingency 
Coefficients. All the coefficients are significant, suggesting association between the two 
variables, but there is more association for questions 1 and 3 than for questions 2, 4 and 6 
This result is consistent with Bayesian interpretations5, although some of this could be 
caused by the wide variation in choices of combinations. In Question 6, for example, 
positive confirmation covers a wide range of bands, not just that immediately inside the 
test rule, so declaring that the test rule is not the same as the unknown rule is not 
irrational. 
   One other point to notice about table 6 is the relatively low number of subjects who, 
when they found out that the combination they had picked was not allowed by the 
unknown rule, went on to say that the test rule was the same as the unknown rule. This 
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demonstrates a high level of consistent thinking in rejecting rules which were proved to 
be false. 
 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
    The results outlined above demonstrate that there is a substantial amount of evidence 
for the existence of positive confirmation  in the choosing of information. In general, 
when searching for information, it can be said that there is significant evidence for 
positive confirmation whether it is rational or irrational. In particular, when positive 
confirmation is not the optimal strategy, then the results are particularly clear- cut. 
   While positive confirmation seems to dominate in all cases, there do seem to be 
differences between the questions being asked. In question 3, for example, there is more 
variation in the combinations chosen than in question 1. Likewise, the variation in 
combinations chosen in question 6 prevents the test for positive confirmation in the band 
immediately inside the test rule from being significant. This suggests, in question 1, that 
matching does have some effect on choice, although the effect seems to be the reverse of 
that expected. Matching effectively reinforces the choice of the band immediately inside 
the test rule. When matching is not possible then the subjects, while still positively 
confirming, vary as to which combination they choose. This, however, does not explain 
the wide variation in question 6 and without more evidence it is hard to see how this can 
be explained. However it is worth pointing out that the data over all questions does show 
a high degree of variance and the variation in question 6 may simply be a manifestation 
of this. 
     Having noted the effects of variation in the selecting of combinations, it should be 
pointed out that this variation does not affect the theory that the subjects are choosing 
evidence according to positive confirmation. Positive Confirmation simply states that 
subjects would in general select combinations inside the test rule without specifying 
particular bands6 and this has been shown to be the case. The differences between 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Although- see table 4- comparatively few subjects actually choose in the Bayesian optimal band. 
6 Unlike the Bayesian- optimal combination which does specify one particular band. 
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questions does not affect this hypothesis although it does raise some interesting questions 
about why there should be so much variation. An investigation of the links between 
matching, with its ability to reduce this variation, and positive confirmation would be a 
particularly interesting avenue for research, although unfortunately it is one for which 
there is insufficient data to investigate in this experiment. 
      Noticeable among the results is the high level of positive confirmation in question 5. 
This is an important result because a positive confirming choice in question 5 is a choice 
of irrelevant evidence. This evidence does not discriminate at all between the test rule 
and all the other rules but it was still chosen by more than a third of the subjects in the 
experiment. 
  As well as the main type of positive confirmation when one is searching for 
information, it has been possible to test the use which has been made of the information 
when it has been acquired. Positive confirmation does lead to a consistent response to the 
decision as to whether the unknown rule is the same as the test rule. In general, there is a 
tendency to say that the two are the same when the combination is allowed and are not 
the same when it is not allowed. This suggests that positive confirmation is a consistent, 
if not rational, means of acquiring information. As well as the general association 
between the subjects reactions and the information, there is also little evidence of 
inconsistent behaviour. In particular there is no evidence of subjects accepting a test rule 
as being the same as an unknown rule  when the test rule has been explicitly rejected.  
    All of these conclusions from the data are consistent with evidence which has been 
found, in a different experiment, in Jones and Sugden (2001). In that paper, it was also 
found that the positive confirmation bias existed, even within an incentive- compatible 
design. In particular, it was found that a subject would choose irrelevant information if it 
confirmed the rule that the subject was testing even if it was costly. It was also found that 
information which is interpreted as confirming a rule increases subjects' confidence in the 
truth of that rule, even if that information had no value. 
    This experiment has replicated these findings and extended them to situations where 
selecting positive confirming evidence may no longer be irrelevant, but is still 
suboptimal. It has been found that, in general, subjects do pick positively confirming 
evidence, while confirming that large numbers choose it even when it is irrelevant. It has 
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also been found that people do make consistent use of the information when they find it. 
However, matching, which was found to have no role in the Jones and Sugden 
experiment does seem to have some role here in focussing the selection of combinations. 
   As in the Jones and Sugden experiment, there is no reason to think that the subject 
would immediately find out that they are making a mistake in using positive 
confirmation, even if there was feedback between questions. A person who chooses a 
combination in a positively confirming band would not find out if they were definitely 
wrong unless their judgement was proved wrong. However this would only happen 
definitively where there was a situation, such as in question 5, if it turned out that the test 
rule was not the same as the unknown rule after the subject claimed (as tended to happen 
in this experiment) that it was. For other inner test rules (as in questions 1 and 3) it is not 
certain that the subject would learn that easily that positive confirmation was the wrong 
method. Making wrong judgements in itself would not be persuasive, since in these 
questions it is perfectly possible (from the subject's point of view) to get the judgement 
wrong and for positive confirmation to be right. The fact that only a small number of 
rules is eliminated by acquiring evidence means that there is still an element of risk in 
getting the right one.  In fact, continued "success" for positive confirmation in 
judgements may even reinforce it as a method of acquiring information7   
     The experiment presented here illustrates that positive confirmation has significant 
effects on how people search for and use information and that this does not necessarily 
result in the optimal use of information. Future research in this field would suggest an 
investigation of whether this phenomenon still exists when subjects are allowed to choose 
their own rules to test and whether this can be applied to interactive choice settings. 
 
           
                                                           
7 This would especially be the case if the subjects' method of learning about learning methods was itself 
positively confirming. 
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                                       Appendix 1: Optimal payoff model 
 
Suppose there exists a set V of N “nested” hypotheses where HV is an arbitrary 
hypothesis chosen for testing. Suppose j indexes a band BjB (where B is the set of all 
bands and jJ where J={1,2,…,N}). Rules are indexed in the same way as the bands 
they define with j increasing from the innermost band outwards. 
 
 Agents are supposed to be testing for the existence of the unknown hypothesis UV, 
where U is selected at random by the experimenter. A message k,j (kK where 
K={allowed by U, not allowed by U}) is the result of picking a combination j and either 
being told it is allowed or is not allowed by U. The agent is judging whether U=H. 
Denote this occurrence by HT. 
  
  r is the utility acquired as a result of correctly claiming that HT holds while (to balance 
Expected Utilities) r/(N-1) is the utility acquired as a result of correctly claiming that HT 
does not hold. In order to rationally select information, the probability of HT is updated 
using Bayes’ Rule. 
Given the prior probabilities: 
 
   P(HT) = 1/N;           
 
  If k = "k is allowed by U" :  P(k,j) = (N-j+1)/N 
 
  If k = "k is not allowed by U": P(k,j) = (j-1) / N 
 
 This gives updated probabilities P(HT/k,j). There are eight possible situations: 
 
i) Testing on Outside;HT holds; Combination allowed by U. 
                     P(HT/k,j) = 0 
 
ii) Testing on Outside;HT holds; Combination not allowed by U. 
                     P(HT/k,j)= 1/(j-1) 
 
iii) Testing on Outside;HT does not hold; Combination allowed by U. 
                      P(HT/k,j)= 1 
 
iv) Testing on Outside;HT does not hold; Combination not allowed by U. 
                      P(HT/k,j) = (j-2) / (j-1) 
 
v) Testing on Inside;HT holds; Combination allowed by U. 
                      P(HT/k,j) = 1/ (N - j + 1) 
 
vi) Testing on Inside;HT holds; Combination not allowed by U. 
                      P(HT/k,j) = 0 
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vii) Testing on Inside;HT does not hold; Combination allowed by U. 
                       P(HT/k,j) = (N - j) / (N - j + 1) 
 
viii) Testing on Inside;HT does not hold; Combination not allowed by U. 
                       P(HT/k,j) = 1 
 
The agent must then decide whether it would be worth more to claim that HT holds or 
not. The eight situations are grouped as follows: 
 
i) Testing on Outside, Combination allowed by U. 
ii) Testing on Outside, Combination not allowed by U 
iii) Testing on Inside, Combination allowed by U 
iv) Testing on Inside, Combination not allowed by U 
 
In order to do this, for each of the four groupings the agent must find 	(k,j) as follows 
for all k: 
 
         	(k,j) = max ( P(HT / k,j) 
 r , 1 – P(HT / k,j) 
 r/((N-1) )  …..(1) 
 
For the next stage the expected utilities for testing on the inside and the outside of H must 
be calculated. This gives: 
 
                   (q) = kK P(k,j) 	(k,j)  …..(2) 
 
  where (q) is the expected payoff of testing in q bands where q  {Inside, Outside}  
 
 Then, going through the algebra the results are: 
 
  (Inside Bands) = r/N [ 1 + (j-1) / (N-1) ]  …..(3) 
 
  (Outside Bands) = r/N [ 1 + (N+1-j) / (N-1) ]   …..(4) 
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                            Appendix 2: Question 1 in experimental questionnaire  
 
                                                  Questionnaire- Red/Blue  
 
Envelope 1 
  
Below, on the left, are a set of possible rules one of which is identical to the rule in 
envelope 1. On the right is a list of combinations of red and blue balls. 
 
Rule (i)  : There must be at least 2 Red balls 1) 10 Blue; 0 Red 
Rule (ii) : There must be at least 4 Red balls 2) 8 Blue; 2 Red 
Rule (iii): There must be at least 6 Red balls 3) 6 Blue; 4 Red 
Rule (iv): There must be at least 8 Red balls 4) 4 Blue; 6 Red 
Rule (v) : They must all be Red balls 5) 2 Blue; 8 Red 
 6) 0 Blue; 10 Red 
 
 
The rule to be tested is Rule (iv) : 
 
There must be at least 8 Red balls 
 
 In order to test this rule you will need to use the combinations as evidence. Ring one 
combination to see if it is allowed by the rule in   envelope 1. 
Once you have ringed the combination, write down the combination you ringed in the 
space below: 
                 ____________________________ 
 
Please stop here until the experimenter comes around to give you information about your 
choice.
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 The combination you ringed  [was/ was not] allowed by the  rule in envelope 1. 
 
Is Rule (iv) the same rule as that in envelope 1? 
 
                          YES                         NO 
 
Circle your answer 
 
Stop here and only go on to the next question when you are told to do so. 
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